The whole DKIM mechanism relies on the fact that it is very hard to crack a key. However that is not always true because short DKIM keys can be cracked quite easily: keys shorter than 1024 bits can be cracked in less than 72 hours by simple bruteforce. Even 1024 keys are now considered to be not secure enough. The recommended length is 2048 bits.
This actually works only if the password is in the first line it, it only outputs the indicators i wrote on there like print (\"Got to here3\") It doesn't print the cracked password or even write it to a text file.
From the image above, we can clearly see that John the Ripper successfully cracked the password to our user Debian. Essentially, the tool was picking a single password from the wordlist, hashing it with the Sha512 algorithm, then compared the resulting hash with the hash we provided until it found a match.
We can also look at the effectiveness of each rule set by comparing success relative to the total candidates tested. For example, we can see that the d3adhob0 rules had the fourth largest candidate size (825 billion), however it cracked only 39.54% of passwords. By comparison the InsidePro-PasswordsPro rule had only 45 billion candidates yet it cracked 47.48% of passwords. The latter rule is clearly more efficient!
Although not the most efficient against all our tests (due to the large number of candidates), the custom rule cracked 2.72% (117,626) more passwords than dive did. Our custom rule was however substantially more efficient than dive which took second place in success rates.
The GPU tool can crack some hashcat-legacy in a shorter time than the CPU tool (MD5, SHA1, and others). But not every algorithm can be cracked quicker by GPUs. However, Hashcat had been described as the fastest password cracker in the world.
Just a note about SPF. It may not be all it's cracked up to be. I forget all the specifics, but when I looked into it a while back, I concluded that it shouldn't be implemented. Here's a link that appears to explain why. 59ce067264